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ABSTRACT
We introduce topological differential testing (TDT), an approach
to extracting the consensus behavior of a set of programs on a
corpus of inputs. TDT uses the topological notion of a simplicial
complex (and implicitly draws on richer topological notions such as
sheaves and persistence) to determine inputs that cause inconsistent
behavior and in turn reveal de facto input specifications. We gently
introduce TDT with a toy example before detailing its application
to understanding the PDF file format from the behavior of various
parsers. Finally, we discuss theoretical details and other possible
applications.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering→ Software testing and debug-
ging; • Mathematics of computing→ Hypergraphs; • General
and reference→ Evaluation.
KEYWORDS
differential testing, simplicial complex, Dowker complex, binary
classifier
1 INTRODUCTION
Differential testing (DT) [18, 33] is an approach to software test-
ing that evaluates the behavior of multiple versions of a program
on multiple inputs. Frequently, DT is performed in the context of
only two programs, one of which serves as an oracle. However,
most programs do not have a formal specification or an oracle that
evaluates the correctness of their behavior, and many of the most
ubiquitous programs (e.g., browsers, document editors, viewers,
etc.) have mutiple versions and/or analogues with broadly equiv-
alent functionality. Indeed, N -version programming [2] elevates
this to a software design principle. Meanwhile, formal verification
of software frequently does not extend to tasks such as parsing
inputs or unparsing outputs, or may rely upon unverified libraries
which have multiple versions. For example, Csmith [55] found bugs
in unverified parts of the mostly formally verified CompCert 1.6
compiler. 1 Finally, plug-ins and configurations (both internal and
external) can introduce further variability into program behaviors.
1 The formally verified part of CompCert 3.6 (the most recent version as of this
writing) only extends from source abstract syntax tree to assembly abstract syntax
tree–with one exception: the parser is also formally verified now [25]. However, a
transformation stage from C to CompCert abstract syntax is still not covered by a
formal proof [30]. On a related note, the problem of formally verifying a C11 parser is
ill-posed due to ambiguities in the informal prose standard [24].
In such a context, we can extract a de facto specification of
acceptable inputs from the collective behavior of similar programs
on a suitably representative corpus. A naive approach in this vein
is to perform a simple voting procedure, which can also yield a de
facto specification of behavior if there is a clear consensus. This
tactic works well for, e.g., independently produced compilers, since
they do not exhibit correlated failures, presumably due to diversity
among internal representations on which most of the compilation
effort is concentrated [55]. However, compilers are atypical pieces
of software: they have carefully designed parsers and intricate
algorithm implementations. More typically, programs have ad hoc
parsers and comparatively simple (if also extensive) internal logic
[23, 36]. This explains the observation of [27] that (non-compiler)
software failures are correlated across versions, and it highlights
the need for a collective differential testing approach to yield de
facto specifications.
Towards this end, we introduce topological differential testing
(TDT), which exploits structure in topological representations of
the collective behavior of a set of programs on a corpus of inputs.
Specifically, TDT forms weighted abstract simplicial complexes
and sheaves [16] that encode inconsistencies and subsequently
identifies the inputs (or via duality and as scale permits, programs)
that behave inconsistently. TDT thereby distills an input corpus to
a consistent subcorpus that reflects a de facto input specification.
While DT has been used for compilers [4, 55], parsers in cryp-
tographic protocols such as X.509/SSL/TLS [1, 5, 26, 51], browsers
[9, 52], and (applications targeting) Android and Java virtual ma-
chines [7, 8, 13, 29], our own considerations are focused on parsers
for complex formats or protocols such as PDF [21, 53] or DDS/RTPS
[10, 45]. In practice, we run a corpus such as the PDF portion of [15]
through sandboxed parsers [17, 31] to produce a relation between
files and parsers that we then analyze using TDT.
This application is motivated by the fact that complex formats
such as PDF have de facto specifications in lieu of, or that sub-
stantially differ from, an informal (i.e., not machine-readable) stan-
dard or specification. Such cases are signified by parser differentials
[23, 26, 36], where various parsers disagree on the validity of certain
inputs. 2 While DT frequently relies on domain-specific knowledge
2 NB. [28] essentially applied DT to PDF readers and files at the rendering level by
performing image processing and error message clustering. We actually employ a
similar tactic in our work by using Cuckoo Sandbox to obtain rendered images and
error messages, while also facilitating additional capabilities such as malware detection
[54].
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of inputs (see, e.g., [5]), TDT assumes the existence of an appro-
priate reference corpus such as [15] and a set of programs that
together implicitly define an input specification. 3
In this paper we restrict consideration to programs that produce
binary outputs: e.g., parsers, binary classifiers, etc. The binary out-
put may simply be a side effect, e.g., the presence or absence of an
error, or the result from a binary question about a more generic
output. While part of the motivation for our more abstract mathe-
matical considerations §4 is to pave the way for directly analyzing
richer non-binary outputs, various postprocessing techniques can
transform generic outputs into binary ones. For example, given
a suitable (dis)similarity measure on outputs as in [28], we can
cluster the outputs and label members of the largest cluster (with
some tiebreaking mechanism) with a 1, and all other outputs with
a 0, in order to obtain a binary relation suitable for TDT. This can
be particularly useful in situations where unspecified or explic-
itly undefined behavior makes it possible for programs to produce
different outputs from the same input without signaling a fault.
The paper is structured as follows: §2 provides motivation and
a gentle introduction to the theoretical framework for TDT. §3
demonstrates TDT by way of a series of examples, and §4 provides
theoretical details. Finally, we make general remarks in §5.
2 MOTIVATION
A de facto file format is determined by the collective behavior of
several parsers. A given file will be accepted (successfully parsed)
by some parsers, but rejected by others. By comparing the set of
files that two parsers accept, we can tell whether one parser is more
stringent than the other, or if the two parsers disagree entirely
about which files should be accepted. We advocate that one should
consider the set of files accepted by a given set of parsers. For small
sets of parsers or files, this kind of analysis can be done in an ad hoc
manner, though the bookkeeping can become quite complex for
even five parsers, as Figure 1 shows. While it might be argued that
the particular Venn diagram in Figure 1 is not optimal for human
understanding, “nice” diagrams in which sets are represented as
congruent ellipses only exist up to the case of five sets. For larger
collections of sets (e.g., seven sets as in Figure 2), this sort of Venn
diagram represents the state of the art, which evidently lags behind
what we might desire. This complexity is effectively managed by
the weighted Dowker complex, whose formal definition we postpone
until §4. We use the weighted Dowker complex to determine which
files are potentially inconsistent with a consensus de facto format,
and demonstrate that this notion of inconsistency can help cluster
contentious aspects of the format.
2.1 Theoretical framework
Suppose that a given file f is accepted by three parsers, A, B, andC .
If we remove parserC from consideration, this does not change the
fact that parsers A and B still accept f . The (unweighted) Dowker
complex records all sets of parsers that accept some file in common
3 NB. A reference corpus can be augmented via differential fuzzing [1, 23], which
essentially seeks to evolve an initial corpus into one whose distribution of accept/reject
statistics tends to the uniform distribution on the power set of programs under con-
sideration [40]. (For general background on fuzzing, see [32]; for a state-of-the-art
technique, see, e.g., [48].) However, this tactic seems to be fundamentally in tension
with TDT.
Figure 1: Visual interpretation of a Venn diagram becomes
exceedingly difficult. Here, we show a Venn diagram for five
setsA, . . . ,E corresponding to parsers, and in which all inter-
sections (i.e., subsets of parsers) are unit squares (in the ter-
minology of [6], a “(2, 3) polyVenn”). The diagram is labeled
with weights corresponding to the numbers of files accepted
by a given subset of parsers in the example of §3.2.
Figure 2: A (3, 4) polyVenn. Though state of the art at this
scale, such a representation is functionally almost useless.
4. While it would make linguistic sense to say that f is accepted
by both the set {A,B,C} and the set {A,B} of parsers, this yields
somewhat weak information. What is important about differential
testing is the differential, after all! To emphasize this point, let
us only say that a given file f is accepted by a subset of parsers
if this subset is maximal, relative to some ambient set of parsers.
Concretely, suppose that we are only concerned with four parsers
A, B, C , and D. If D rejects f , then we shall say that f is accepted
by the set {A,B,C}, but not the set {A,B,C,D} (since D rejects f ),
nor the set {A,B} (since this is not maximal). The number of files
(or even the set of files themselves) serve as the weights on each
subset of parsers.
Let us now consider the difference between the sets of files
accepted by two sets of parsers X and Y . Based on our definition,
if we assume that X ⊆ Y we cannot assume that the set of files
accepted byX is a subset of (or a superset of) the set of files accepted
by Y . But under the hope that there actually is a de facto format
for the files being accepted or rejected by the parsers, we generally
4Or some minimal number of files in common, should one obtain too many sets.
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expect the set of files accepted by Y will be larger than that of X .
That is to say, the number of files accepted by each parser in the set
difference Y\X should be small if there is to be consensus between
the parsers about the format. Given this hope, we say that X and
Y are consistent if the number of files accepted by Y is larger than
that of X and inconsistent otherwise. Intuitively, two sets of parsers
are inconsistent if they disagree about the de facto format.
We can compute which files are at fault for inconsistency be-
tween two sets X ⊆ Y of parsers, simply by identifying which files
accepted by every parser in X are rejected by at least one parser in
Y . We call those files inconsistent for the pair of sets of parsersX ⊆ Y .
Briefly, a file f is inconsistent if X is not the largest set of parsers
in which each one accepts f . A given file being inconsistent means
that it potentially causes the parsers to disagree about the de facto
format, and the file therefore likely contains a contentious feature.
Since there may be several points of contention between parsers
about the de facto format, it is wise to prioritize them. Our strategy
is to sweep over all pairs of subsets of parsers, recording how many
deem a given file inconsistent, which we call the file’s inconsistency
score. The example in §3.2 highlights that files with similar usage
patterns of contentious features are clustered by the inconsistency
score. Entirely compliant files will typically have a low score, as
will files with severe format problems. On the other hand, files that
have an unusually high inconsistency score will tend to show more
subtle and varied issues. This seems to happen because develop-
ers of relatively permissive parsers make minor – but different –
assumptions about how to repair partially compliant files.
3 EXAMPLES
This section outlines three different example applications of TDT
to identify files that fail to meet an ad hoc consensus file format.
(1) A toy example to outline the construction;
(2) The Govdocs1 corpus [15], in which the format is mostly
followed, and as processed by a set of five parsers;
(3) A test corpus produced under the aegis of the DARPA Safe-
Docs program, in which many files that violate the format
are included.
3.1 A toy example
Suppose that we have four parsers (A, . . . ,D) that attempt to read
20 files. Each parser may either accept or reject each file, which we
can encode as a binary 1 or 0, respectively. It is helpful to organize
all of the results in matrix form, such as
R =
( 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
)
.
in which each column represents a file and each row represents a
parser. For instance, the first file (column) was only accepted by the
first parser; it was rejected by all other parsers. Since there are four
parsers, there are 16 possible subsets of parsers including the empty
set. Let us collect which subsets of parsers accept at least one file in
common. For instance, parsers (rows)A,C , and D all accept the last
four files (columns). Parsers B andC both accept file (column) 13 in
common; even though both parsers accept other files, they do not
agree on accepting any other file. There are also subsets of parsers
that do not agree on accepting any file. For instance, parsers A, B,
and C cannot all agree on accepting any file, even though every
pair of parsers out of these three accepts a file in common.
{A}; 1 {B}; 2 {C}; 2 {C}; 1
{A,B}; 3 {A,C}; 1 {A,D}; 2 {B,C}; 1 {C,D}; 3
{A,C,D}; 4
Figure 3: Weighted Dowker graph for the toy data using “re-
verse” order ({•}). Faces of the Dowker complex (see §4) cor-
respond to graph nodes, which are marked with tuples of
rows followed by face counts. Inconsistent edges are red.
It is helpful to organize the information collected in the matrix
in a diagram called a weighted Dowker graph, shown in Figure 3.
The figure shows each subset of parsers that agrees on accepting
at least one file. The labels also include the number of common
accepted files, so the label {A,C,D}; 4 means that there are 4 files
that are jointly accepted by each of the three parsers A, C , and D.
We will call the number of files accepted by a subset of parsers the
weight of that subset. The arrows indicate subset relations, so that
each subset of parsers points to each of its subsets.
Recalling that we are looking for a consensus about an ad hoc
format, we expect that disagreements between parsers should be
uncommon. When we exclude a parser from consideration, any
resulting subset of parsers should accept fewer files; weights should
not increase when following the arrows in the weighted Dowker
graph. Every instance where this assumption holds is termed a
consistent subset relationship and is marked with a black arrow in
Figure 3; otherwise it is termed inconsistent and is marked with a
red arrow.
As noted before, parsers A, C and D all accept four files in com-
mon. If we exclude parser D, then the resulting subset (parsers A
and C) additionally accepts file 10 in common. (It is of course the
case that the four files accepted by parsers A, C , and D are still
accepted by both parsers A and C , but this is not new information.)
Since parsers A and C only accept one new file when we exclude
parser D, this suggests that the three parsers mostly agree on the
de facto format.
On the other hand, parser C accepts an additional 2 files if we
remove parser A from the pair of parsers {A,C}. This suggests that
there is some disagreement between parsers A and C , though it is
perhaps somewhat minor. In particular, since parser C accepts files
4 and 5 in addition to the ones it accepts in common with parser
A, it is likely that these two files contain some contentious aspect
of the de facto format, at least from parser A’s perspective. Thus,
when there are inconsistent subset relationships, we can identify
which files are potentially at fault for this inconsistency. To identify
all files that are potentially contentious, it is important to realize
that files represented in a given inconsistent subset relation may
be cause for acceptance or rejection elsewhere in the weighted
Dowker graph. Specifically, the fact that files 4 or 5 are implicated
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in a contention between parsers A and C does not absolve these
files from causing a contention with parser D as well.
We posit that
the minimally acceptable de facto format is likely em-
bodied by a subgraph of the weighted Dowker graph
which is an upwardly closed subset and fully consistent.
That is to say, each subset of parsers is in a consistent subset relation
with each of its subsets. For this example, such a subgraph consists
of the following parser subsets {A,B}, {A,D}, {C,D}, {A}, {B}, {C},
and {D}. Any file that is accepted by a subset of parsers other than
one of these is deemed an inconsistent file, and potentially contains
a contentious aspect of the de facto format. In this example, files 10,
13, 17, . . . , 20 are inconsistent.
3.2 The Govdocs1 Corpus
To establish a baseline for parser agreement in a typical set of files,
we processed the PDF portion of the Govdocs1 corpus [15] using
five parsers (caradoc [12], mutool, pdfminer_dumppdf, pdftools-
_pdfparser, and poppler_pdfinfo). We ran these parsers to col-
lect the output to stderr from each parser for analysis. 5 In partic-
ular, a parser sending any output (resp., no output) to stderr was
deemed to reject (resp., accept) the file. As in §3.1 we summarized
the result of this processing as a matrix, in which each row corre-
sponds to a parser and each column corresponds to a file. For visual
clarity, we represent the matrix as the image shown in Figure 4, in
which acceptance and rejection are respectively indicated in white
and black.
Figure 4: The parser-file relation for thewhole Govdocs1 cor-
pus, represented as a Boolean matrix. 1’s (acceptances) are
shown as white, 0’s (rejections) as black.
0 1 2 3 4 5
caradoc
mutool
pdfminer_dumppdf
pdftools_pdfparser
poppler_pdfinfo
Figure 5: A sorted and scaled representation of the parser-
file relation.
It is visually apparent from Figures 4 and 5 that the caradoc
parser rejects far more files than the others (this is a consequence
5 Although these parsers are open-source command line tools that are readily instru-
mented, using, e.g. Cuckoo Sandbox to monitor self-contained PDF software would
allow us to go beyond (and also avoid) merely rendering files as in [28]: besides col-
lecting output to stderr, such an approach also enables the detection of nonevasive
malware [54].
of caradoc’s intended use as a PDF validator), but that there is
wide agreement otherwise. This intuition is borne out by actu-
ally estimating the probability that a typical file is accepted by a
given parser, either individually or conditioned on acceptance by
another parser. Using counts of acceptances/rejections over files in
Govdocs1 for the purpose of estimation, we have
Parser Pˆ(accept)
caradoc 0.2109
mutool 0.9691
pdfminer_dumppdf 0.9882
pdftools_pdfparser 0.9916
poppler_pdfinfo 0.9489
From this we see caradoc is the most stringent of the five parsers,
accepting approximately one file out of every five. The others are
much more permissive, accepting most files.
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Figure 6: Pairwise comparison of parsers over the whole
Govdocs1 corpus. Greater conditional probabilities repre-
sented as brighter shades of grey.
The pairwise conditional probabilities, shown in Figure 6, are
to be interpreted as giving the probability that the parser on the
column label accepts a file given that the parser on the row has
already accepted the file. In virtue of the last row, one may conclude
that if caradoc accepts a file, other parsers usually do too (again,
this is a consequence of caradoc’s intended use as a PDF validator).
The middle block indicates that mutool, pdfminer, and pdftools
usually agree. The first column indicates that caradoc’s behavior
cannot be inferred from the other parsers, aside from the fact that
it usually rejects files that the others accept.
Although conditional probability is a useful tool, it is funda-
mentally pairwise. Relationships among three or more parsers are
not considered unless we lift our perspective to the power set of
programs under consideration, which brings us to the entry point
for TDT. With this in mind, we plot the weighted Dowker graph
as before, in Figure 7. Again, we can see (from the top row of the
Dowker graph) that pdfminer (row 2 in Figures 4 and 5, using zero-
based indexing) and pdftools (row 3) are (individually) the most
permissive, since they accept many more files on their own that
are otherwise not accepted. The inconsistency at the bottom of the
graph along the subset relation (0, 1, 2, 3, 4)→(1, 2, 3, 4) emphasizes
caradoc’s stringency: even when all other parsers accept a file,
caradoc rejects it more often than not. Specifically, the number of
files accepted by the set of all parsers is substantially smaller than
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Figure 7: Weighted Dowker graph for the Govdocs1
corpus. Inconsistencies labeled in red. Graph nodes
correspond to the subsets of {0, . . . , 4} indicated below
the nodes, where 0, . . . , 4 respectively correspond to
caradoc, mutool, pdfminer_dumppdf, pdftools_pdfparser,
and poppler_pdfinfo. The correspondingweights are shown
above the nodes. While this visual representation is more
convenient than those in Figures 1, 4, and 5, the algorithmic
approach of §4 to identifying consistent subsets of the
power set of programs is ultimately necessary.
the number of files accepted by the set of parsers not including
caradoc.
To identify which files are potentially causing the inconsistency –
and thus could be representative of differences in the ad hoc format
implemented by different parsers – we trace back to the columns
of the matrix shown in Figure 4 to identify the inconsistent files.
Specifically, we identify those files corresponding to subsets of
parsers that are not contained in the upwardly closed, consistent
subgraph of the weighted Dowker graph. Under this definition of
an inconsistent file, it happens that every file is a potential cause of
inconsistency somewhere in the weighted Dowker graph 6 shown in
Figure 7. Even though a given edge in the graph may be consistent
– and the files accepted by the parsers involved – those same files
happen to be inconsistent at some other edge. To provide more
useful information, we relax the notion of an inconsistent file to
an integer inconsistency score for each file. To assign this score,
we iterate over subsets of parsers, restricting our attention to just
those parsers for the computation of the inconsistent files. The
inconsistency score is the number of subsets of parsers that deem
the file to be inconsistent.
The inconsistency score is more tolerant of differences in parser
behavior. For instance, every file is inconsistent for the set of all five
parsers, but most files are not deemed inconsistent when caradoc
is excluded from consideration. On the basis of statistics alone, it
would seem wise to exclude caradoc entirely, but in fact some
subsets of parsers that include caradoc do not deem every file
inconsistent. An even-handed approach, as we suggest here, is
therefore warranted.
6 The identity of the files is not readily recovered from Figure 7 as it requires identifying
columns in Figure 4.
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Figure 8: Histogramof inconsistency scores for the Govdocs1
corpus.
1 8541
caradoc
mutool
pdfminer_dumppdf
pdftools_pdfparser
poppler_pdfinfo
Figure 9: The Govdocs1 parser-file relation restricted to files
with inconsistency score less than 7.
Figure 8 shows a histogram of inconsistency scores for all files.
Intuitively, binning files by their inconsistency score appears to
cluster files based on “dialects” of the de facto format. We also
see a clear boundary in the distribution: most files are deemed
inconsistent by 7 or more subsets of parsers (caradoc’s behavior
results in most of these), but few files have less than that. These
few files are worth investigating further.
As a first pass, we can restrict the relation shown in Figure 4
to only the files with inconsistency score less than 7. We plot this
relation matrix in Figure 9, and see some striking features. Most
of these files are unusual because only pdfminer and pdftools
accepted them. Since these parsers are the most permissive, the
files in question are probably on the edge of acceptability, and are
quite possibly out of spec altogether.
A clear subset of files is accepted only by pdftools. This subset
contained 261 files. To explore the causes of these files being selected
as unusually inconsistent, we examined the stderr output from
the parsers that rejected these files. We found that 212 of these
files were actually being accepted, even though there was stderr
output. Of the remaining 37 files, one of them was not a PDF file at
all, six of them crashed one of the parsers, and the remainder had
malformed objects. Although the purpose of our approach is not to
diagnose specific format violations, the similarity of the kinds of
stderr reports indicates that inconsistency score does appear to
cluster contentious files with similar problems.
3.3 A test corpus
We also applied TDT to a test corpus of 120 files that were nominally
compliant with the PDF standard, and most of which were designed
to violate precepts of the format. The test corpus was designed
by an independent performer to evaluate the ability of performers
on the DARPA SafeDocs program to identify format violations
during a hackathon, using Govdocs1 in advance to produce a de
facto definition of what constitutes a valid PDF file. Of these 120
files, 82 were deemed to be non-compliant.
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1 120
caradoc
mutool
pdfminer_dumppdf
pdftools_pdfparser
poppler_pdfinfo
Figure 10: The hackathon parser-file relation.
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Figure 11: Histogram of inconsistency scores for the
hackathon dataset.
Unsurprisingly, the test corpus behaved substantially differently
than Govdocs1, and in particular was collectively much less adher-
ent to any de facto standard:
Parser Pˆ(accept)
caradoc 0.1417
mutool 0.8417
pdfminer_dumppdf 0.6500
pdftools_pdfparser 0.7333
poppler_pdfinfo 0.3583
We analyzed this corpus both in its own right and using a binary
PDF validity classifier “trained” by using TDT on Govdocs1 as in
§3.2. Because of our experience on the Govdocs1 data, we decided
to exclude pdftools from the analysis, but retained the other four
parsers, namely caradoc, mutool, pdfminer, and poppler. The
binary classifier selected a file as being not compliant with the de
facto standard whenever two or more parsers rejected it. (Note that
for the purposes of this exercise, actual compliance with the de facto
standard itself was adjudicated by the independent performer as
noted above.) Since caradoc was again the most stringent parser,
this usually meant that files marked as non compliant by the binary
classifier were rejected by caradoc and another parser.
Of the 120 files, the binary classifier’s precision was 92% and its
recall was 97%, resulting in an F1 score of 95%.
To delve into the reasons why specific files were rejected by the
parsers according to our binary classifier, we computed the distri-
bution of inconsistency scores for the test corpus (using the same
parsers as in §3.2), shown in Figure 11. Note that this histogram
is much flatter than the one for Govdocs1, which is probably an
artifact of the strategy for causing file malformations (note also
that far fewer files are present than for Govdocs1).
Nearly all of the files selected by our binary classifier had an
inconsistency score of less than 3 or equal to 6. Indeed, using that
as an ex post facto decision rule results in a precision of 100%, recall
of 85%, and an F1 score of 91.5%.
Below, we describe the results from investigating the spikes
visible at inconsistency scores 2, 4, and larger than 5 and explore
the reasons for parse failures that occurred. Files with inconsistency
11
9
11
8
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7
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6 94 92 87 80 79 78 64 52 42 31 30 3
('poppler_pdfinfo','Unterminated')
('poppler_pdfinfo','EOF')
('poppler_pdfinfo','Lexing')
('poppler_pdfinfo','Syntax')
('pdfminer_dumppdf','Unterminated')
('pdfminer_dumppdf','EOF')
('pdfminer_dumppdf','Lexing')
('pdfminer_dumppdf','Syntax')
('caradoc','Unterminated')
('caradoc','EOF')
('caradoc','Lexing')
('caradoc','Syntax')
Figure 12: Table of errors parsers send to stderr for files
with inconsistency scores of 2. White signifies the presence
of a keyword match; gray signifies its absence.
score 0 were all non compliant files, which essentially means that
all of the parsers agreed about the disposition of these files.
Inconsistency Score 2. The files with inconsistency score 2 hap-
pened to be those files that were accepted by mutool (and ultimately
pdftools also, though we did not use its output) but rejected by
the other parsers. All of these files were marked by our binary
classifier as being non-compliant, and all of these files were indeed
not compliant.
There are numerous different error reports produced on stderr
for the parsers that rejected each file with inconsistency score
2. To quantify what kinds of error messages were produced on
stderr, we performed a simple keyword search. These result of
this search is summarized in Figure 12; a white box indicated that a
particular keyword search term was found in that parser’s stderr
(column) in a given file (row). Note that the keywords used for
the search are different for each parser, since they structure their
output differently. However, each file (row) contains a match for
at least one of the keywords given for each parser. This suggests
that we have a complete, if coarse, characterization of the errors
produced. 7
Given the results of the keyword search in Figure 12, it appears
that these files mostly contain syntax and lexing issues due to
files ending in unexpected places. Depending on exactly where
the files end, different parsers appear to handle the file differently.
For instance, caradoc claimed that the files contain syntax or lex-
ing errors, and terminated immediately at that point. As a result,
caradoc never noticed that these files seem to end oddly, because
it had already aborted processing. In contrast, the other parsers did
not notice the error as aggressively, but instead continued process-
ing. They only noticed that something was amiss when they hit the
end of the file unexpectedly.
Inconsistency Score 4. There were three different classes of be-
havior for files with inconsistency score 4:
• 17 files were accepted by all parsers
• 2 files were rejected by caradoc, mutool, and poppler, and
• 3 files were rejected by caradoc and pdfminer.
The binary classifier selected the 5 files in the latter two categories
as not compliant. Of all of the inconsistency score 4 files, the binary
7See also the error message clustering of [28].
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1 48
caradoc
mutool
pdfminer_dumppdf
pdftools_pdfparser
poppler_pdfinfo
Figure 13: The hackathon parser-file relation restricted to
files with inconsistency scores greater than 5.
classifier made exactly one error: one file in the latter category
(rejected by both caradoc and pdfminer) was actually deemed to
be compliant.
Highly inconsistent files. We can also restrict our attention to
only the files with high inconsistency scores. These files should
be expected to exhibit features that the parsers will generally find
contentious – not specifically files that are badly formatted, but for-
matted in a way that at least some parsers find objectionable while
others do not. If we restrict our attention to the relation between
parsers and files with inconsistency score greater than 5, the result
is shown in Figure 13. These highly inconsistent files are generally
accepted by most parsers, but definitely not caradoc and usually
not poppler. These files likely have only have small malformations.
The error messages reported on stderr are highly variable but
mostly seem to be syntax issues. It might be the case that data
payloads (which the parsers don’t read directly) are corrupted, or
are of incorrect length.
4 THEORETICAL DETAILS
4.1 Weighted Venn diagrams
Form,n ∈ N, consider a set ofm programs and a set of n inputs.
Without loss of generality, take these sets to be [m] := {1, . . . ,m}
and [n], respectively. Let R be a relation between [m] and [n] that
models the behavior of programs on inputs à la (j,k) ∈ R if and only
if program j accepts input k . We also abusively write R ∈ Mm,n (F2)
or R ∈ Mm,n (N) as circumstances and convenience dictate.
To any relation R, we can associate a abstract simplicial com-
plex, i.e., a hypergraph with all sub-hyperedges. Each hyperedge is
called a face (or simplex), and maximal faces are called facets. The
construction is straightforward: vertices correspond to elements
of [m], i.e., rows of R or programs; faces correspond to subsets of
[n] represented by columns of R, i.e., sets of programs that accept a
common input. Specifically, the Dowker complex D(R) for a relation
R has [m] as its set of vertices, and [p0,p1, . . . ,pk ] is a simplex of
D(R) whenever there is a f ∈ [n] such that (pi , f ) ∈ R for some
i = 0, . . . ,k . By a theorem of Dowker [11, 16], the two abstract
simplicial complexes respectively formed in this way from R and
its transpose are topologically equivalent, and hence it is only a
minor abuse to call either of these the Dowker complex associated
to R (Figure 14).
In practice,m ≪ n (i.e., we have many more inputs than pro-
grams), and so the Dowker complex associated to R is not very
informative (there are either too many redundant simplices or ver-
tices, depending on which convention we choose for the Dowker
complex). But we can “project” R onto the power set 2[m] as follows.
Figure 14: (Left) The Dowker complex associated to our toy
example of §3.1. The “hole” (which as it happens can be
detected using simplicial homology [16]) suggests that pro-
gram B behaves differently than the other programs. (Cen-
ter left) The Dowker complex of the dual/transposed rela-
tion is homotopically equivalent: since it has 10 vertices
(corresponding to unique matrix columns), we show yet an-
other homotopically equivalent (collapsed) complex with
vertices corresponding to non-redundant columns. (Center
right) The weighted Dowker complex associated to our toy
example. (Right) The six inputs corresponding to the red
faces (i.e., the complement of the interior in the Alexandrov
topology) cause inconsistent program behaviors.
First, define a matrix P ∈ Mm,2m (F2) so that the ℓth column of
P is the binary representation of ℓ − 1, i.e. ℓ = 1 + ∑mj=1 Pjℓ2j−1.
Next, we define a weight tuplew ∈ N2m by counting the number
of columns of R that equal a given column of P . That is,wℓ := |{k :
R ·,k = P ·, ℓ}|.
For each subset of programs under consideration, the associated
weight is the number of files that (exactly) that subset of programs
accepts. Accordingly, we call the weight tuplew the weighted Venn
diagram of R, or often simply the diagram (Figure 15). By attaching
Figure 15: The weighted Venn diagram for our toy example
of §3.1.
weights to faces, we obtain a weighted Dowker complex (Figure 14)
and an equivalent weighted partial order whose representation as
a digraph is called the weighted Dowker graph, and which we have
already encountered (Figure 3).
In this way, the weights can also be thought of as a function
w : D(R) → N on the Dowker complex defined by
w(σ ) := #{ f ∈ [n] : (p ∈ σ and (p, f ) ∈ R) or (p < σ and (p, f ) < R)}
for each simplex σ ∈ D(R).
4.2 Deficiency and consistency
We should hope that programs agree more than they disagree, so
that we can trust their agreement in which files are acceptable. To
this end, we call a region of a diagram (i.e., a subset of programs
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⊆ [m]) deficient if its weight is less than the weight of any of its
facets (regions which correspond to subsets of the set of programs
for the region in question, where the subsets have one fewer element
than the original). Intuitively, a deficient region represents a set of
programs that collectively disagree with another program.
We call a diagram inconsistent if any of its regions are deficient.
Otherwise, a diagram is consistent. Rather simply, the weight func-
tion w is consistent whenever it is an order preserving function.
If w is not consistent, say for two simplices σ ⊆ τ , we have that
w(σ ) > w(τ ), then a given file f ∈ [n] is inconsistent for the pair
σ ,τ if there is a p ∈ τ\σ such that (p, f ) < R. Ifw(σ ) ≤ w(τ ), then
no files are deemed inconsistent for that pair of simplices.
4.3 Basic results
Definition. A filtration of an abstract simplicial complex is a re-
verse inclusion-ordered family of subcomplexes.
Lemma. The diagram of R is consistent if and only if its weights
produce a filtration on the abstract simplicial complex given by the
subsets of the domain of R.
Proof. For weights to produce a filtration on a simplicial com-
plex, the weight assigned to any simplex must be no less than the
weight assigned to any simplex in the its boundary. If a diagram
is inconsistent, then its deficient region corresponds to a simplex
whose filtration value is too small. If a diagram’s weights cannot
produce a filtration, then some simplex must have a filtration value
smaller than the value of one of the simplices in its boundary. A
simple induction shows that some simplex between these two (in
the boundary of the former and the coboundary of the latter, inclu-
sive) corresponds to a region of the diagram that must be deficient.
□
Definition. The diagram on R′ is a subdiagram of the diagram
on R if and only if R′ is a domain restriction of R.
Lemma. If a diagram is consistent, then all of its subdiagrams are
consistent.
Proof. Let the diagram of R have weightsw . By induction, we
only have to prove the subdiagram obtained by removing one pro-
gram to be consistent. Let ∇jR be the restriction of R obtained by
removing the jth program. The weights ∇jw of the diagram of ∇jR
are simply ∇jw(X ) = w(X )+w(X ∪ {j}) for X ⊆ [m]\{j}. To prove
that any region X in the subdiagram is not deficient, we cite that
both of the regions X and X ∪ {j} in the original diagram are not
deficient, and that inequalities are additive. The result follows. □
Remark. If a diagram is inconsistent, then any diagram for which
it is a subdiagram is also inconsistent. It is simple to check whether
the diagram of a relation with only one program is consistent.
Remark. If an inconsistent diagram has N deficient regions, then
all of its diagrams have at most N deficient regions, usually fewer.
4.4 Algorithm
The results in the previous section suggest the following algorithm
to, given a diagram, produce a consistent subdiagram:
We are given the diagram of some relation R. We start by restrict-
ing R to only those programs for which the associated diagram
is consistent — call this restriction ∇∀R. Then, we iteratively re-
move programs until the remaining relation produces a consistent
diagram:
Let the diagram of ∇∀R have deficient regions d1, . . . ,dN . Let
di be the region with the greatest number of programs (if there
are multiple such regions, ties are broken by deficiency, i.e. the
difference between a region’s weight and its faces’ largest weight;
further ties are broken arbitrarily). Consider the face of di with the
greatest weight (ties broken arbitrarily): this face includes all but
one of the programs in di — call this excluded program the jth one.
We restrict ∇∀R to all programs in its domain except j, create the
subdiagram, and repeat.
We have not yet analyzed the computational complexity of this
algorithm, not least since in practice the number of programs should
usually be small enough for exponential-time algorithms to run in
reasonable time. We also note that this algorithm is not guaranteed
to produce a maximal restricted relation, i.e., a relation to which
no program could be added without resulting in an inconsistent
diagram. We also note that the algorithm’s result is deterministic if
and only if ties are broken deterministically.
4.5 An even simpler example
Consider
R =
( 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
)
.
Then (see Figure 16)w = (1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 1) and the region corre-
sponding to {A,B,C} is deficient (by its face {A,C}), as well as the
regions {A,B} and {B,C} (by any of their faces). If we construct the
subdiagrams of singleton restrictions of its relation (see Figure 17),
we see we should exclude program B. The diagram of the resulting
relation (left panel of Figure 18) has two deficient regions {A}, {C}:
we arbitrarily choose {C}. This region has only one face (), and
this face excludes C , so we restrict the relation to exclude C . The
resulting relation has a consistent diagram (right panel of Figure
18).
4.6 Sheaf interpretation
(NB. This section assumes familiarity with the notion of a sheaf, for
which see, e.g. [16].)
The algorithm of §4.4 is similar to the algorithm presented in [41]
(see also [42]), which deterministically yields all maximal sections
of a sheaf (albeit at higher computational cost). We can convert our
question to be suitable for this algorithm:
Let X be the abstract simplicial complex of sets of programs. We
give this space the “reverse” Alexandrov topology (i.e. we switch the
usual definitions of upper and lower sets). Let S be a sheaf over X
defined as follows. The sections of S for a k-simplex are partitions
of the set of files into 2k+1 possibly empty classes (i.e., partitions
into the regions of a Venn diagram of the programs comprising
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Figure 16: (Left) Venn diagram for the projected relation.
There is a “gap” between the set of 3 files accepted by pro-
gram B and rejected by programs A and C and the sets of 2
files accepted by program A and rejected by programs B and
C, of 3 files accepted by programs A and C and rejected by
program B, and of 2 files accepted by programC and rejected
by programs A and B. (Right) Another representation of the
same diagram as a (1, 2) polyVenn.
7
7
6
8
7
7
A B C
Figure 17: Diagrams of the singleton restrictions of the
above relation. B should be excluded, since its diagram is in-
consistent.
4 3
3
4
A
C
7 7
A
Figure 18: (Left) Diagram of the above relation’s restriction
to {A,C}. This diagram has two deficient faces. (Right) Dia-
gram of the above relation’s restriction to {A}. This diagram
is consistent.
that simplex). The restriction maps of S are coarsenings of these
partitions: the section of a k-simplex should have each class equal
to the union of the corresponding 2j−k classes in the section of any
j-simplex on its coboundary. We also define consistency functions
[43, 44] as follows: an assignment is consistent at some simplex if
all the restriction maps produce the same section, and if that section
corresponds to a consistent diagram (as discussed above).
The example in Figure 19 is shown as a global section of a sheaf
in Figure 20. Instead of listing the files themselves, this particular
sheaf merely retains the counts of files in each region. Although not
shown, the components in the stalks are ordered lexicographically.
The maximal elements in the partial order still have rather elaborate
sections. This indicates that the sheaf really “wants” to be built on
the intersection lattice of the sets {A,B,C} rather than on X as we
1 2
3
20
4
30
40
900
A
B C
Figure 19: Weighted Venn diagram for a projected relation.
{A}; N4;
(2, 20, 30, 900)
{B}; N4;
(3, 20, 40, 900)
{C}; N4;
(4, 30, 40, 900)
{A,B}; N6;
(2, 3, 30, 40, 20, 900)
{A,C}; N6;
(2, 4, 20, 40, 30, 900)
{B,C}; N6;
(3, 4, 20, 30, 40, 900)
{A,B,C}; N7;
(2, 3, 4, 20, 30, 40, 900)
Figure 20: “Reverse” face order ({•}); sheaf (N•); global sec-
tion (∈ N•) for the example shown in Figure 19. Components
in the stalks are ordered lexicographically.
have done. We leave for future work a proof that our construction
is sufficient (and perhaps minimally sufficient) to reconstruct the
sheaf over the intersection lattice.
Summarizing, the present sheaf stores the partition of the files
into all combinations of programs at the highest simplex, and stores
simplifications of this partition (i.e. forgetting some programs) in
the other simplices. The restriction maps simply ensure that the
“simplified” partitions are properly defined. The consistency func-
tions’ primary purpose, rather than ensuring the globality of an
assignment, is to check the consistency of Venn diagrams (the whole
sheaf formulation is just a way to apply the algorithm of [41] to this
notion of consistency). From the perspective of implementations, it
is convenient to define sections in terms of the number of files in
each partition class, as in Figure 20.
4.7 Selection of files
Once we run the algorithm from §4.4, the weights indeed yield a
filtered simplicial complex. Now an obvious strategy is to pick a
suitable filtration value and exclude files corresponding to simplices
that appear at lower filtration values.
In the example of figure 19, choosing a threshold of 20 would
eliminate the 10 (of 1000 total) files that are accepted by at most one
program; a threshold of 900 would eliminate the 100 files that are
accepted by at most two programs. There is not any obvious reason
to consider another choice unless there is nontrivial connectivity
(an obvious criterion is to conservatively preclude that possibility,
at least using homology in dimension zero, i.e., to require that
there be a single connected component). But suppose now that the
numbers 40 and 900 were replaced by 240 and 700, respectively:
then another natural choice emerges.
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5 REMARKS
Relations are ubiquitous, and it is likely that (the mathematical
ideas behind) TDT can be applied more generally. We outline a
progressive widening of scope here:
• Using delta debugging [20, 56] to provide inputs to TDT
could help patch diverse implementations.
• The technique of [49] learns deterministic finite automata (or
equivalently, regular expressions) corresponding to SSL/TLS
common names on a per-implementation basis. Since DFAs/
regexes are closed under union and intersection, TDT could
extend this technique to determine a de facto standard for
such common names by considering multiple implementa-
tions.
• Coupling TDT with differential fuzzing of machine learning
or data science algorithms with similar functionality [19, 38,
39, 50] is a particularly fertile ground for future work.
• TDT should also be applicable to binary classifers more gen-
erally [22], though even our specific context of parser/format
evaluation is adjacent to applications such as data structure
evaluation [35] and malware multiscanning [47].
5.1 A useful relation “product”
Let R ⊆ [m] × [n] be a relation between programs and inputs as
usual, and let S ⊆ [n] × [p] be a relation between inputs and input
features of some sort (e.g., key words in text inputs), i.e., (k, ℓ) ∈ S
if and only if input k has feature ℓ. For each X ⊆ [m] let R |X
be the restriction of R to X × [n], and write inc(X ) for the set of
inconsistent inputs according to this restriction. For each X and
feature ℓ, let RS(X , ℓ) := ∧ S(inc(X ), ℓ), where we indicate logical
AND and treat S as a Boolean matrix. Then RS(X , ℓ) = 1 if and
only if every inconsistent file relative to X contains feature ℓ–in
other words, RS measures if feature ℓ is responsible for differential
behavior. 8
Writing
([m]
r
)
:= {Y ∈ 2[m] : |Y | = r }, consider (RS¬r ) := {ℓ :
RS
( ( [m]
m−r
)
, ℓ
)
= 1}. The sets (RS¬r ) form a partition of [p], and by
truncating the range of r , we get a principled way to trade off
between feature and program coverage. For example, if we consider
parsers and white-space delimited tokens, then inputs containing
significant natural language (e.g., PDFs with text in streams) will
obey Zipf/power law statistics for the frequencies of various tokens,
meaning that there is no principled way to truncate the distribution
for analysis (e.g., to reverse engineer a particular aspect of the
format). The present construction offers a principled workaround
that allows us to trade off how many syntax features we consider
(along with natural language text) with how many parsers are
involved. Moreover, we can build on this by varying S (i.e., taking
subsets of features) and comparing the resulting partitions into sets
of the form
(RS
¬r
)
. By greedily removing features that minimize a
distance between partitions (e.g., the variation of information [34]),
we can obtain features that are correlated with program behavior.
8 We might also consider RS ′(X , ℓ) := ∧ S (inc(X ), ℓ) ∧∧¬S (inc(X )c , ℓ), where
the complement in X is indicated: this construction additionally requires that every
input that is not inconsistent does not contain feature ℓ.
5.2 Related techniques
5.2.1 Bernoulli mixture models . Bernoulli mixture models (BMMs)
provide a natural framework for modeling binary data [37, 46]
that has several parallels with TDT. The basic idea of a BMM is to
treat a binary matrix as sampled from a probability distribution
of the form
∑
j α jpj where α j ≥ 0,
∑
j α j = 1, and each pj is a
Bernoulli distribution of the form pj (x) = ∏k πxkjk (1 − πjk )1−xk .
In practice, the number of mixture components (i.e., the range of
j above) and the parameters πjk are respectively estimated via
some model selection criterion and an expectation maximization
algorithm.
With a BMM in hand, we could, e.g., remove small mixture
components and renormalize to “denoise” the model, but both the
model selection criterion and thresholding required here introduce
a degree of arbitrariness beyond the modeling Ansatz, which may
itself be unjustified. Meanwhile, the forensic link between “noise”
and input behavior is also weaker in the BMM approach than for
TDT. That said, it may be useful to consider BMMs in concert with
TDT by modeling the initial data as well as the result of removing
inconsistent inputs. Such an approach could yield improvements
over the approach of [28], which used K-means++ clustering of 0-1
vectors encoding errors triggered by files by a given implementation
(specifically, of PDF readers).
5.2.2 Formal concept analysis . TDT is similar in some respects to
formal concept analysis, not least in that the latter can be viewed
algorithmically as the result of a topological simplification of binary
data [3, 14]. It would be interesting to see if there is some more
concrete and direct relationship between TDT and formal concept
analysis.
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